Fallacy Of Misplaced Concreteness Research Articles

Internet Economics: Writing on the Virtual Wall

Most economic literature on the internet views the internet through the lens of private markets. However, the internet, concretely, as a collection of software protocols, is intrinsically a public good, as economists define them. The article reviews a selection of conventional approaches to the internet; the focus of which, on markets, is an example of Alfred North Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced concreteness. On closer analysis, these markets turn out to be traditional business activities enabled by internet applications, which are themselves not market “goods.” An alternative analogy is that of a virtual public square, the walls of which are used as a communal bulletin board. This image is actually a close representation of the way that the early internet was developed. A number of policy conclusions are drawn from this contrasting approach. The public good character of the internet needs to be protected against private interests, including the current group of internet oligarchs. In line with Thomas Piketty’s work on the extreme levels of income and wealth inequality that have evolved in the global economy, some small measure of correction can be assisted by making the private appropriators of the public good pay for the services that the internet provides to them.

Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced concreteness and the unfortunate uselessness of all monetary-macro theory micro-founded on Walrasian-Pareto general equilibrium theory

Abstract Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced concreteness (FMC) explains the ‘unfortunate uselessness’ into which all monetary-macro theory ‘micro-founded’ on Walrasian-Pareto general equilibrium (GE) theory has blundered. The FMC occurs because the misuse of the Walrasian-Pareto GE idealisation results in mistakes in reasoning when applied to monetary-macro theory. Consequently, theorists who employ the Walrasian GE idealisation as a foundation for monetary-macro theory are caught on the horns of a dilemma. Either money is appended when it is not required, violating the principles of monetary theory or money is abolished, (the ‘cashless limit’) and theorists are forced to change the meaning of words and economic concepts, in the process deceiving themselves and the reader. This paper provides a general explanation of the way all models based on the Walrasian-Pareto GE idealisation commit the FMC. There is no escape if the Walrasian GE idealisation is retained; models that employ it are unscientific and should be abandoned.

Myth of objectivity and the origin of symbols.

An age-old challenge in epistemology and moral philosophy is whether objectivity exists independent of subjective perspective. Alfred North Whitehead labeled it a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"; after all, knowledge is represented elusively in symbols. I employ the free energy principle (FEP) to argue that the belief in moral objectivity, although perhaps fallacious, amounts to an ancient and universal human myth that is essential for our symbolic capacity. To perceive any object in a world of non-diminishing (perhaps irreducible) uncertainty, according to the FEP, its constituent parts must display common probabilistic tendencies, known as statistical beliefs, prior to its interpretation, or active inference, as a stable entity. Behavioral bias, subjective emotions, and social norms scale the scope of identity by coalescing agents with otherwise disparate goals and aligning their perspectives into a coherent structure. I argue that by declaring belief in norms as objective, e.g., expressing that a particular theft or infidelity was generally wrong, our ancestors psychologically constructed a type of identity bound only by shared faith in a perspective that technically transcended individual subjectivity. Signaling explicit belief in what were previously non-symbolic norms, as seen in many non-human animals, simulates a top-down point of view of our social interactions and thereby constructs our cultural niche and symbolic capacity. I demonstrate that, largely by contrasting with overly reductive analytical models that assume individual rational pursuit of extrinsic rewards, shared belief in moral conceptions, i.e., what amounts to a religious faith, remains a motivational cornerstone of our language, economic and civic institutions, stories, and psychology. Finally, I hypothesize that our bias for familiar accents (shibboleth), plausibly represents the phylogenetic and ontogenetic contextual origins of our impulse to minimize social surprise by declaring belief in the myth of objectivity.

An Unnecessary War: The Tragedy and Wasted Effort of the Conflict between Science and Religion

The supposed conflict between science and religion is widely assumed to be longstanding and inevitable, but in fact is very recent, logically invalid, and unnecessary. Science and religion belong to different domains of human experience, so each can decide only between alternative explanations offered within their own domain, not across domains. The conflict image can descend into warfare when both sides ignore the dangers of misinterpreting the logical rules of inference and of selective perception of data. The most strident voices rarely admit their mutual lack of training in the sophisticated philosophy of metaphysical reasoning and the serious literature underlying their opponents’ position. Both sides base their arguments on necessarily incomplete models of invisible realities, treated as if they are as tangible as real life, so both fall into the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” Atheists promote materialism as a simpler alternative to religion, ignoring warnings from quantum physicists that the structure of the world is increasingly mysterious, and far from simple. Science does not entail materialism. The conflict image could be defused with dignity if the opposing sides agreed to take each other seriously, consider the hierarchical structure of reality seen and unseen, and work together for the benefit of the communities of both science and religion.

Asia

This essay operates from a challenge that is evident in Miyoshi’s life and career, a humility of our knowledge system and the quest to exceed it. I suggest that Asia is trapped within a historical framing (as the Orient) that prevents people and places within Asia from extracting themselves from that condition of being. The problem lies within the conflation of Asia as a relational condition and the places of Asia, which adds materiality to the idea. History and the nation have been the media and form through which this problem has emerged and how many have tried to extract themselves. This circularity, I argue, reiterates what Alfred North Whitehead calls a “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.”

Kierkegaard After the Genome: Science, Existence and Belief in This World by Ada S. Jaarsma

Reviewed by: Kierkegaard After the Genome: Science, Existence and Belief in This World by Ada S. Jaarsma Ronald F. Marshall Kierkegaard After the Genome: Science, Existence and Belief in This World. By Ada S. Jaarsma. New York and London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017. xiii + 227 pp. Jaarsma sets out to right the wrong of ignoring Kierkegaard’s connection to the natural sciences. “Whether it is the curative logic of health, the normative logic of community or the modern logic of genomic science, the lures of the present age challenge us, but also, on Kierkegaard’s terms, compel us into more impassioned, critical, ecologically attuned relations” (40). She does this in spite of Kierkegaard’s insistence that belief in Christ matters more than understanding the natural orders of creation. For in Christ’s redemption Kierkegaard saw God’s greatness “in a deeper sense” than in creation (Christian Discourses, trans. Hongs, 289). But this abiding conviction gets no play in Jaarsma’s broad ranging book. Jaarsma contests President Bill Clinton’s view that the Human Genome Project’s mapping-out displayed “the language in which God created life” (61). For her there are no “magic genes”—that would “literally reproduce [themselves] tautologically” (50, 57). No, what is given “need not be timeless” (72). And so genes are better rendered as concepts than as simple causal agents (66). Jaarsma mounts her critique using Kierkegaard’s attack against “leveling” all existence into aggregates, thereby disrupting all “fixed and immutable mechanisms” of inheritance (56, 50). For Jaarsma inheritance is “modifiable” (70). So we are neither “haunted” by our past (61, 73), nor “hard-wired” by our genes (73, 51), since properly construed they are not “deterministic” (63). So we are free to be, given that there is “no single, standard, normal DNA sequence, shared by each one of us” (68). Neither can there be any “normative ethics” (182), but only “ethics in a minor key” (189). We have “no genetic explanation for living particularity” (70). In this critique she also links Alfred North Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (191, 59, 32, 11) to Kierkegaard, turning him into “an early process philosopher, an ally of Whitehead (3, 26, 33). [End Page 460] Jaarsma also uses this attack against leveling to displace any grounding of the individual in the transcendent (189, 62, 33, 10). There is no “outside” to our existence, she writes, “no way of propelling ourselves outside of the lived abstractions by which we share agency to varying degrees with others” (59). We have “no god’s-eye view from which to adjudicate existence” (37). Therefore Christian faith becomes belief in the world (2, 10, 31n11, 39, 183–200). Yet Kierkegaard insists on the self being grounded in what is outside of us, or resting ”transparently in God” (Sickness Unto Death, trans. Hongs, 30). Undaunted, Jaarsma flattens out Kierkegaard because she believes that divine authority inexorably leads to “docility,” leaving undisturbed our unjust status quo (198). Then the “very liveliness of existential life” is all over for her (183), and the human “spark” dies out (36, 129, 161, 191, 209, 212). Then nothing counters the “normalizing pull of adaptation” (207). But Kierkegaard knew of more. He knew that the obedience of faith actually leads to nonconformity with the world (Rom. 1:5; 15:6), not to belief in it. He knew that Christianity brings about a “polemical stance against the great human society” (Journals, trans. Hongs, 4:4175). Martin Luther, his favored tutor (Journals, 3:2422, 2465), reinforced this. For Luther the fear of God leads to wide-ranging fearlessness, not to docility; and being a “rebel” becomes the indelible Christian mark (Luther’s Works 51:139; 13:414). Jaarsma argues throughout that her critique of genomics opens up the way to accepting homosexual behavior since there is no one normal way of being sexual (21–24, 179–83, 213–16). This makes Kierkegaard an early proponent of queer advocacy (26). It would have been illuminating to have had her critically assess the argument by the gay activist Frank Browning that no one is born gay, seeing it instead as a choice based on desire (The Culture of Desire: The Paradox and Perversity in Gay...

Academic Medical Centers and the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness

Abstract Academic medical centers (AMCs) are a familiar target of critics who charge the US health care system with indifference to the most pressing needs of the public. AMCs are frequently faulted, for example, for promoting specialization instead of primary care, for favoring high-tech services rather than the promotion of health and prevention of illness, and for failing to adequately meet the needs of the disadvantaged. An organizational perspective, with particular attention to the structure, mission, and environment of this institutional form, suggests that these critiques may misplace onto AMCs responsibility for solving problems with deep roots in the larger political economy of health care policy in the United States. By the same token, however, the pressures of that political economy (i.e., environment) on AMCs progressively strain their structure, mission, and (arguably) their capacity to serve the public interest.

Neuroscience and Whitehead II: Process-Based Ontology of Brain

While neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain, the implications of these empirical findings for ontological questions in philosophy including the mind–body problem remain yet unclear. In the first paper, I discussed the model of brain that as implied and supported by the empirical data. This leads me now to the question of an empirically plausible ontology of brain. Therefore, the aim in this second paper is the ontological characterization of the brain in terms of a process-based ontology that avoids what Whitehead described as “simple location” and “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. The discussion of the model of the brain is complemented by developing a process-based ontological characterization of the brain. Specifically, as based on Whitehead, I argue that “simple location” of the brain as thing or object in time and space amounts to nothing but an abstraction rendering what Whitehead described as “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. Instead of describing the brain as static, non-temporal and isolated thing or object, I characterize the brain ontologically by dynamic, temporal, and relational processes. This leads me to a process-based ontology of brain which may be specified in spatiotemporal terms. Since the world’s larger spatiotemporal range or scale contains, e.g., nests, the smaller one of the brain, I characterize their ontological relationship by “spatiotemporal nestedness” and “spatiotemporal directedness”. Such spatiotemporal relationship between world and brain precludes the confusion between the world as whole and the brain as part, e.g., “mereological confusion”. I conclude that process-based or better, more specifically, spatiotemporal ontology of the brain and its relationship to the world may offer novel views on the question for the ontological relationship between mind and brain, e.g., the mind–brain problem, by converting or reformulating it as “world-brain problem”.

Keeping Open by Re-Imagining Laughter and Fear

Speaking to the debate on the nature of critique, this article is about the struggle to produce an account when listening to and retelling stories. It begins with the disconcertment over listening to a coherent story that emerges in interviews about the development of performance indicators for Dutch hospital care. The indicators are presented as solutions to the problem of unruliness in the healthcare world. Drawing on Helen Verran's work on generative critique I slow down the ‘problem-solution-found’ plot. Instead of contrasting the apparently coherent stories with the complexities of an ‘underlying’ practice of healthcare, I hold on to my initial disconcertment so that ‘fleetingly subtle’ interruptions become entry points for generative critique. Taking Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's understanding of the relation that fear and laughter have to alterity, I show how fear and laughter permit generative critique within seemingly coherent stories. In the case of indicator development, the interviewees ‘laugh away’ what they consider alter from quality and safety in healthcare: having no control over what is going on, polyglotism instead of a common language, and inaction as opposed to taking one's time. Paying attention to disconcerting interruptions generates sensitivity and questions rather than yet another set of (critical) problem-solution-found answers. How can ridiculed (laughed away) subjectivity be acknowledged as important entry points for including alterity in supervision? And how to position the acknowledgement, not as an antidote, but as a way of rendering the fear of alterity generative? Nurturing sensitivities is crucial for keeping open, which means resisting both the sticky tendency of normalizing accounts and the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. I conclude that keeping open by re-imagining critique resonates with the creativity of collective life in actual times and places. Thereby it offers a promising potential for doing worlds differently.

The Influence of Alfred North Whitehead on Eric Voegelin

The aim of this article consists in pointing out pertinent features of Alfred North Whitehead’s speculative thought inherited and expanded upon by Eric Voegelin. I will follow Voegelin’s declarations before introducing my own theoretical proposals. In particular, I will focus on three concepts proposed by Whitehead that resonate in Voegelin’s thought, namely those of “climate of opinion,” “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” and “process.” By highlighting the intellectual continuity between these two thinkers (while not obscuring their crucial differences), I will reflect upon their place within the historical trajectory of ideas.

The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness

Cambridge mathematician and Harvard philosopher Alfred North Whitehead provided excellent advice for scientists. He said, “Seek simplicity but distrust it” (1Whitehead A.N. Russell B. 2nd Ed. Principia Mathematica. Vol. III. Cambridge University Press, New York1963Google Scholar). Scientists who like to explain observed phenomena by reduction, and to model experimental results using (mostly mechanical) models, often follow the first part of Whitehead’s sentence while forgetting the second. For describing the thermodynamic and phase-equilibrium properties of globular-protein solutions, it has been customary to model the protein as a hard sphere bearing an electric charge that depends on the solution’s pH. The charged sphere interacts with other spheres through electrostatic and (London) dispersion forces in a continuous dielectric medium that may contain other globular solutes as well as salt at known ionic strength. Using the concept potential of mean force coupled with hard-sphere perturbation theory, it is then possible to calculate the phase diagram where temperature is plotted against the number density of protein particles in the solution, as shown in Fig. 1. This procedure is similar to the more than 60-year-old DVLO theory for describing the thermodynamic properties of colloid solubilities. Upon making some structural assumptions about globular-protein crystals, it is also possible to calculate liquid-solid as well as liquid-liquid equilibria for protein solutions (2Mahadevan H. Hall C.K. Statistical-mechanical model of protein precipitation by nonionic polymer.J. Am. Inst. Chem. Eng. 1990; 36: 1517Crossref Scopus (88) Google Scholar). Numerous publications along these lines have appeared in the literature, although comparisons with experiment are rare (2Mahadevan H. Hall C.K. Statistical-mechanical model of protein precipitation by nonionic polymer.J. Am. Inst. Chem. Eng. 1990; 36: 1517Crossref Scopus (88) Google Scholar, 3Arzenšek D. Kuzman D. Podgornik R. Colloidal interactions between monoclonal antibodies in aqueous solutions.J. Colloid Interface Sci. 2012; 384: 207-216Crossref PubMed Scopus (46) Google Scholar, 4Boström M. Tavares F.W. Prausnitz J.M. et al.Effect of salt identity on the phase diagram for a globular protein in aqueous electrolyte solution.J. Phys. Chem. B. 2006; 110: 24757-24760Crossref PubMed Scopus (46) Google Scholar, 5Kunz W. Tsurko J. Thermodynamics of Amino Acid and Protein Solutions. Transworld Research Network, Kerala, India2010Google Scholar, 6Liu H. Kumar S.K. Sciortino F. Vapor-liquid coexistence of patchy models: relevance to protein phase behavior.J. Chem. Phys. 2007; 127: 084902-084905Crossref Scopus (113) Google Scholar, 7Minton A.P. The effective hard particle model provides a simple, robust, and broadly applicable description of nonideal behavior in concentrated solutions of bovine serum albumin and other nonassociating proteins.J. Pharm. Sci. 2007; 96: 3466-3469Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (54) Google Scholar, 8Minton A.P. Effective hard particle model for the osmotic pressure of highly concentrated binary protein solutions.Biophys. J. 2008; 94: L57-L59Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (32) Google Scholar, 9Piazza R. Interactions and phase transitions in protein solutions.Curr. Opin. Colloid Interface Sci. 2000; 5: 38-43Crossref Scopus (138) Google Scholar, 10Stradner A. Sedgwick H. Schurtenberger P. et al.Equilibrium cluster formation in concentrated protein solutions and colloids.Nature. 2004; 432: 492-495Crossref PubMed Scopus (904) Google Scholar, 11Tavares F.W. Prausnitz J.M. Analytic calculation of phase diagrams for solutions containing colloids or globular proteins.Colloid Polym. Sci. 2004; 282: 620-632Crossref Scopus (41) Google Scholar). Authors of the extensive literature on the theory of protein solutions have not been inhibited by the many (often drastic) simplifications required to obtain a simple result, perhaps relying on J. H. Hildebrand’s remark (J. H. Hildebrand, University of California, Berkeley, personal communication, 1979) that, when trying to establish a simple theory for a complex phenomenon, it is better to make many, rather than a few, simplifying assumptions because there is a good chance that the errors from some assumptions will be canceled by the errors from some other assumptions. Hildebrand’s remark (J. H. Hildebrand, University of California, Berkeley, personal communication, 1979), coupled with the first part of Whitehead’s advice (1Whitehead A.N. Russell B. 2nd Ed. Principia Mathematica. Vol. III. Cambridge University Press, New York1963Google Scholar), provide music to the ears of those applied scientists (like me) who want an easy solution to a complex problem. Of course applied scientists know that, in principle, calculations based on colloidal behavior are not really valid for protein solutions and that one should not confuse globular proteins with perturbed hard spheres, as stated in Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced concreteness, where results from a model are erroneously believed equivalent to reality. Although we may not want to admit it, deep-down we know that the perturbed-hard-sphere theory is not correct for representing the properties of a protein solution. It’s bad, yes, but how bad? Little attention has been given to this question until the pioneering work of Sarangapani et al. (12Sarangapani P.S. Hudson S.D. Pathak J.A. Critical examination of the colloidal particle model of globular proteins.Biophys. J. 2014; 108: 724-737Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF Scopus (64) Google Scholar) published in this issue of the Biophysical Journal. Sarangapani et al. (12Sarangapani P.S. Hudson S.D. Pathak J.A. Critical examination of the colloidal particle model of globular proteins.Biophys. J. 2014; 108: 724-737Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF Scopus (64) Google Scholar) have performed extensive experimental studies of bovine serum albumin (BSA) solutions as a function of pH, ionic strength, and protein concentration at several temperatures. Experimental studies include rheology, neutron scattering, and ultraviolet circular dichroism. These studies, coupled with extensive published data for BSA, show that models based on colloidlike assumptions are in serious error. The authors conclude that proteins are not simple particles of fixed dimension; they are polyelectrolytes whose configurations change with solution conditions, especially with protein concentration. The potential of mean force depends strongly on protein concentration due to changes in the protein’s tertiary structure. The authors present convincing evidence (12Sarangapani P.S. Hudson S.D. Pathak J.A. Critical examination of the colloidal particle model of globular proteins.Biophys. J. 2014; 108: 724-737Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF Scopus (64) Google Scholar) that “The idealized view in the literature that proteins such as BSA are rigid ellipsoidal colloidal particles, whose size and shape are invariant with protein concentration and pH, is found to be untenable.” Protein particles in solution are much more complex than hard spheres in solution even when the properties of hard sphere are adjusted (perturbed) by addition of a variety of interparticle attractive and repulsive forces. Unlike hard spheres, protein particles change size, shape, and extension as solution conditions vary. In an initial effort toward improved understanding, the authors discuss a more realistic interpretation of scattering data than that provided by the conventional method based on colloidlike behavior. To obtain a better understanding of BSA properties in solution, the authors suggest molecular-dynamic simulations. Many (like me) will be secretly unhappy about the demise of the colloidlike theory of globular-protein solutions. Although we knew that this theory was “sick”, we hoped that it might “recover”. But now, after the report of Sarangapani et al. (12Sarangapani P.S. Hudson S.D. Pathak J.A. Critical examination of the colloidal particle model of globular proteins.Biophys. J. 2014; 108: 724-737Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF Scopus (64) Google Scholar), the colloidlike theory is dead; the Sarangapani group have delivered a coup de grâce. We can take comfort in the remark of Sarangapani et al. (12Sarangapani P.S. Hudson S.D. Pathak J.A. Critical examination of the colloidal particle model of globular proteins.Biophys. J. 2014; 108: 724-737Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF Scopus (64) Google Scholar) that, while scientifically erroneous, the colloidlike theory may nevertheless be useful for some purposes in biotechnology. Thank you! That’s like saying even a placebo can sometimes cure an illness. While we mourn with sadness, we also owe much thanks to Sarangapani et al. (12Sarangapani P.S. Hudson S.D. Pathak J.A. Critical examination of the colloidal particle model of globular proteins.Biophys. J. 2014; 108: 724-737Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF Scopus (64) Google Scholar) for reminding us that, when describing nature, yes, by all means seek simplicity but, with respect for complexity, don’t forget to mistrust it. Critical Examination of the Colloidal Particle Model of Globular ProteinsSarangapani et al.Biophysical JournalFebruary 03, 2015In BriefRecent studies of globular protein solutions have uniformly adopted a colloidal view of proteins as particles, a perspective that neglects the polymeric primary structure of these biological macromolecules, their intrinsic flexibility, and their ability to sample a large configurational space. While the colloidal perspective often serves as a useful idealization in many cases, the macromolecular identity of proteins must reveal itself under thermodynamic conditions in which the native state is no longer stable, such as denaturing solvents and high protein concentrations where macromolecules tend to have screened excluded volume, charge, and hydrodynamic interactions. Full-Text PDF Open Archive

Accounting, Accountability, and Misplaced Concreteness

Abstract In this article I argue that management accounting practices cause today’s business managers to commit what Alfred North Whitehead referred to as the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." These practices cause managers to drive operations with quantitative accounting abstractions and divert their attention from the concrete reality of what it means to run a business well so that it contributes to building a sustainable economy and a flourishing society.

What Young Children Know About Living and Learning With Companions

INFANCY AND EDUCATION Theories of how children learn have been led by concern for forming young minds so they can talk and act well in society. Children who are old enough to speak are to be trained so they will grow up responsible and productive citizens, articulate, literate and numerate, and perhaps, eventually, good parents. In the 1930s science believed that children, as exceptionally intelligent animals, learn by conditioning. In the 1960s the new theory of learning proposed that inherent cognitive processes, principally informed by visual experience and designed to be mediated by language, should be fostered to adapt to novel information and solve rational problems. In neither theory were imaginative intentions or emotions of the active and creative child, in its body and communicating with its more intimate senses, given primary place. Infants, too young and inarticulate to conform to formal classroom teaching were presumed to need care, not education. But thoughtful observers and experienced teachers have long believed children are born with powers for creative and cooperative learning. They have perceived that a child learns by their own curiosity and invention, and that the playful imagination of infants and toddlers holds the secret of all imaginative learning in good company. Comenius said it well in the 17th Century, as did Dewey and Whitehead in last century. They argued against Cartesian intellectual individualism, undemocratic imposition of social rules, and what Whitehead called “the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” Jerome Bruner presented a new and richer view of cognitive growth in infants in 1968. He has repeatedly insisted that children want to evaluate a shared world as a resource for creativity and cooperation (Bruner, 1990, 1996). Some of us have been attempting to find scientific support for a theory of infantile human nature that gives importance to individual feelings and imagination, to sympathetic development of motives and values with companions of all ages. We have tried to understand the appetite preschool children have for making and receiving narratives of both fantasy and reality in physically active engagement with the environment and with family and peers. Children gain experience and explanations with “human sense”, evaluating the world by sharing tasks with emospecial edition: is there knowledge about how to handle children under three in ecec?

Theory and the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness

Theory and the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness

Tropical forest biomass estimation and the fallacy of misplaced concreteness

AbstractDespite the importance of measuring tropical forest biomass, the accuracy of biomass estimates is poorly constrained due to fundamental weaknesses in the design and implementation of field studies. We identify these issues and propose a radical paradigm shift to advance tropical forest biomass research to a firmer theoretical and empirical basis.

The Pitfall of Hypostatization/Reification and the Reality of Social Things

Hypostatization, (reification in one of its many senses) or the fallacy of misplaced concreteness refers to an abstraction being “treated as if it were a concrete, real event, or physical entity.” Hypostatization has occurred when concepts, frameworks, and theories freeze into pictures of reality that cannot be shaken by reality.There is a natural psychological tendency to assume that every word in language refers to something outside of language. Beliefs about the reality of the things of nature, such as gravity, heat, kinetic force, stones, and water, are usually unproblematic even though, as Kant demonstrated, these beliefs must involve an element of interpretation. Natural scientists are rarely concerned by the doubts of philosophers as to whether a real world exists. It is easy to grasp how the things existing in the natural world can kick back at the hypotheses scientists attempt to impose, and render them problematic.It is understandable that social scientists also tend to view the concepts they use, like the political system, elite, social class, interest group, bureaucracy, and capitalism as referring to real things in the real world, as do the concepts of stone, tree, and thunderstorm. This commonsense naive realist view of a reality existing independently of our knowledge has deep roots in the human psyche and in language. Few doubt the existence of a social world that can sometimes shatter our false beliefs about it. Yet it remains unclear just what it is that might kick back at the hypotheses social scientists make about it. When social scientists set about to study things like governments, markets, or power, they must have some idea of the nature of the things they wish to research. They make assumptions about the things they intend to investigate and these assumptions play a crucial role in determining what kinds of information to gather and how to gather it. Yet when the notions of social reality underlying social science research are scrutinized, it becomes clear how tenuous their representation can be.Without a clear sense of what is “out there” in the real world, concepts tend to create worlds of their own without protest from reality. Facts can always be found that fit the concepts. When a clear notion of social reality is present, that reality can kick back and shatter propositions that are made about it. This reduces the potential for hypostatization.This paper argues that a clear sense of social reality is usually missing in social science research, and that this accounts for the tendency to hypostatize. It attempts to develop a remedial approach to hypostatization by suggesting ways of developing an adequate, practical ontology of the social. Words are not simply labels for things. Improving our sense of real social world is the only effective means to combat reification. Research seeks to discover concrete sources of orderliness in social reality that can serve as objective constraints on the hypotheses the research seeks to impose.

Process Sub-politics: Placing Empirical Flesh on Whiteheadian Thought

This paper is more explorative than programmatic. It attempts to place empirical flesh on some of Alfred North Whitehead's speculative thoughts on concrete apprehensions. The challenge lies in the fact that Whitehead was vague on the subject. While Whitehead offers numerous thoughts on why we mistake the abstract for the concrete he wrote considerably less on how we can get ourselves to think more concretely. I therefore examine an empirical case and work ‘backwards’, showing its affinities with process thought. A largely invisible phenomenon within the social/political theory literature is the empirical subject of this paper: the agricultural field day (though the events examined are not of the conventional variety). The paper begins with an overview of Whitehead's critique of abstraction and the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Attention then turns directly to the case study to empirically ground Whitehead's thoughts on doing more concrete abstractions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Center for Process Studies (CPS) Political Theory Colloquium II, Claremont, CA (26–28 February 2009). Thanks to all who participated at this event (with a special thanks to John B. Cobb).

Creativity and the fallacy of misplaced concreteness in new drug development

PurposeA dominating view in the literature of organizational creativity is to treat the creativity as anex postfactoconstruct rather than a process that may be subject to systematic and thoughtful managerial practices. Drawing on Alfred North Whitehead's writing, the paper seeks to examine how creativity is conceptualized in the pharmaceutical industry.Design/methodology/approachThis study is based on a series of interviews with managers and scientists in three pharmaceutical companies.FindingsAlthough researchers and managers designate the role of organizational creativity as the most important strategic capability of the firm, there is almost no communication about it. The respondents point out a gap between understanding and action in the innovation process, i.e. what precedes it in new drug development. This gap is clearly illustrated – creativity is what makes the difference for the companies – but hardly anyone talks about it.Practical implicationsFrom a management perspective this paper concludes that organizational creativity in new drug development can become a more actionable concept by capturing images and narratives relevant to the organizational reality.Originality/valueIn contrast to the dominated individualistic centered view of creativity, this paper argues that creativity does not occur at a single point in time but is rather the outcome from a series of interconnected events and undertakings. A process‐based view of creativity can thus escape the misplaced concreteness that the mythology of creativity postulates. Whitehead's process philosophy may form a fruitful foundation from which organizational creativity can be understood and exploited.

The “Clerical Paradigm”: A Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness?

Perception of the “clerical paradigm” as the main problem of practical theology and theological education has perpetuated a “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” as philosopher Alfred North Whitehead might say, or the mistaking of a helpful generalization for concrete reality. Does the concept of the clerical paradigm adequately comprehend the problems, or does it contain hidden prejudice against practice and doubts about the church itself? This article argues that the idea of the “clerical paradigm” has so dominated the discourse of practical theology that it has distorted understanding of the needs of pastoral practitioners, misdirected blame, and hence left other problems unattended, particularly the rise of an equally challenging problem, which might be called the “academic paradigm.” In relying so heavily on the construct of clerical paradigm, theologians eager to revitalize practical theology inadvertently denigrate congregational and pastoral “know-how.” The article begins with an analysis of Edward Farley's proposal, but the challenge lies less here than with its subsequent use and misuse. The article therefore turns from this analysis to an exploration of problems raised by the academic paradigm and alternative ways to redeem the value of practical know-how so readily dismissed under the reign of the clerical paradigm. Zusammenfasssung Die Wahrnehmung des „klerikalen Paradigmas“ als Hauptproblem der Praktischen Theologie und der theologischen Ausbildung hat den „Trugschluss der unzutreffenden Konkretheit“ , wie der Philosoph Alfred North Whitehead sagen dürfte, oder das Fehlen einer hilfreichen Verallgemeinerung für die konkrete Realität immer wieder verfestigt. Versteht das Konzept des „klerikalen Paradigmas“ die Probleme angemessen, oder enthält es verborgene Vorurteile gegen die Praxis und zweifelt an der Kirche selbst? In diesem Artikel wird argumentiert, dass die Idee des „klerikalen Paradigmas“ den Diskurs in der Praktischen Theologie so dominiert hat, dass es das Verstehen der Bedürfnisse der pastoral Tätigen verzerrt, Verantwortung fehl adressiert und folglich andere Probleme unberücksichtig gelassen hat, insbesondere das Aufkommen eines ebenso herausfordernden Problems, welches das „akademische Paradigma“ genannt werden kann. Indem sie sich so sehr auf das Konstrukt des „klerikalen Paradigmas“ verlassen haben, werteten Theologen, die danach eiferten, die Praktische Theologie zu revitalisieren, unbeabsichtigt gemeindliches und pastorales „know-how“ ab. Der Artikel beginnt mit einer Analyse von Edward Farleys Ansatz, aber die Herausforderung liegt weniger hier als in dem daraus folgenden Gebrauch und Missbrauch. Deshalb wendet sich der Artikel weg von dieser Analyse hin zu der Erforschung von Problemen, die durch das „akademische Paradigma“ hervorgerufen werden, und zu Alternativen, um den Wert praktischen Wissens wiederzuentdecken, welcher unter der Herrschaft des „klerikalen Paradigmas“ so bereitwillig vernachlässigt wurde.

Experience Without Qualities: Boredom and Modernity (review)

ion of categories of language and their reifi cation into things. Although Goodstein does not use the term, this fallacy could be called the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” (This is a phrase that Alfred North Whitehead coined in connection with his critique of scientifi c materialism. Its use suggests the affi nities between his critique and Goodstein’s account of the modern rhetoric of refl ection.) In the case of Kuhn, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness takes the form of an abstraction drawn from the historically and culturally specifi c language of boredom that Kuhn and his audience share and its reifi cation as an ahistorical principle that grounds Kuhn’s idealist language on boredom. In the case of Lepenies, this fallacy takes the form of an abstraction drawn from the language of boredom and reifi ed as the social practices that ground Lepenies’s language on boredom. Neither Kuhn’s idealist history nor Lepenies’s materialist sociology recognize the historicity of the modern discourse on boredom. Goodstein faults Kuhn and Lepenies for their failure to think through the relationship between the language of boredom and the language on boredom. The conditions that make this failure possible are addressed in Chapter 3, “Boredom and the Modernization of Subjectivity.” This chapter describes the spread of Enlightenment skepticism in an environment of rapid political and economic change. Beginning toward the end of the eighteenth century and continuing to the middle of the nineteenth, a discursive paradigm shift occurs. The result is a rhetoric of refl ection organized around a radically isolated subjectivity and a “clocktime” view of temporality, time as a series of empty, meaningless moments stretching forward in linear progression. This rhetoric of refl ection maintains a tension between idealist and materialist accounts of experience within a materialist framework that medicalizes subjectivity. Goodstein’s genealogy of the modern discourse on boredom is strongly reminiscent of Foucault’s genealogy of modernity. However, she distinguishes her discourse analysis from Foucault’s, arguing in effect that Foucault is guilty of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The key to her argument is Anson Rabinbach’s claim about the rise in the nineteenth century of “transcendental materialism,” a materialist idealism that, as capitalist industrial ideology and utopian inspiration, structures modern subjectivity. According to Goodstein, Foucault’s “microphysics of power” is, by virtue of its Nietzschean inheritance, grounded in the same transcendental materialism as the modernity it analyzes. It operates as a kind of materialist idealism, rendering invisible the historical particularity it shares with modernity. One of the consequences of this is that Foucault’s analysis is unable to account for its own critical power.